The purpose of this article is to outline a schematic system for describing texts or “discourses” with respect to discourse function. In this system the concepts of performative and of descriptive discourse function take a central position. Provisional explicate for the said two concepts are introduced. A special sort of performative is identified, viz. statements; the concept of statement is to function as a pragmatic counterpart to that of description. An examination and comparison is made of the requirements which the (...) communication context of a discourse has to fulfil in order that this latter qualify as a performative in general or as a statement. Then the question is considered how a performative and a descriptive discourse can be “justified” or shown to be adequate. Eventually the aforesaid descriptive system is introduced, and the role is examined which the explicata of performative and descriptive discourse function may play in the philosophy of science and in axiology. (shrink)

"Bartley and Radnitzky have done the philosophy of knowledge a tremendous service. Scholars now have a superb and up-to-date presentation of the fundamental ideas of evolutionary epistemology." --Philosophical Books.

Anglo-Saxon schools of metascience.--Continental schools of metascience.--Toward a theory of research that is neither logical reconstruction nor psychology or sociology of science.--References (p. 420-438).

(1) What may be gained by applying concepts generalised from economics to methodological problems? The perspective of cost-benefit analysis ('CBA' for short) may help the researcher to see what sorts of questions he should take into account when dealing with particular methodological problems. This claim is supported by applying generalised CBA-thinking to two standard problems of methodology. (2) In the practice of research the handling of basic statements does not normally constitute any problem, and no conscious decision is involved. In (...) the methodological reconstruction the key questions are: 'How can a particular basic statement be criticised?' and 'What are the costs of defending a statement that is "problematic"?' The problem of the empirical 'base' is an investment problem: whether or not to invest time and effort into processing a particular basic statement into a falsifying hypothesis for the theory we wish to test. The valuation of the costs of rejecting or, as the case may be, of defending a basic statement, are objective. (3) With respect to theories, in basic science, the issue is not one of acceptance or rejection of a single theory, but rather of theory preference. Both the rational response to a falsification and rational theory preference are governed by CBA-considerations. The option for one of two competing theories is based upon a CBA where the valuation of benefits and costs is objective. Theory change is an objective process, at least in those fields, where theorising is closely controlled by empirical testing: the better theory drives out the less good theory. The costs of defending a theory that is less good than its competitor are mainly epistemic resources forgone. The use of CBA in methodology not only is compatible with Popper's position, but it may pay to view Popper's methodology as an application of CBA to epistemic situations. (shrink)

Popper's methodology does not entail any playing down of the various indispensible distinctions such as the distinction between knowing and guessing, the distinction between myth and science, the distinction between the observational and the theoretical, and between the vernacular and technical sublanguages or technical vocabulary. By avoiding both the totalization that led to the foundationalist position and the scepticist reactions to these frustrated foundationalist hopes, Popper's methodology makes it possible to combine fallibilism with a realist view of theories. It combines (...) the perennial willingness to re-examine positions, statements, etc. with the claim that a particular theory (as an item of knowledge in the objective sense) constitutes cognitive progress over its rivals. However, some of his formulations have been deliberately provocative and in this way have given rise to certain misgivings about possible paradoxical implications, even in philosophers congenial with Popper's approach. The concept of knowledge in the objective sense is, of course, an explicatum which Popper proposes primarily for use in methodology and epistemology. The concept is an expression of the acknowledgment of fallibility in principle. The phrasing that ‘knowledge is conjectural’ or ‘knowledge is fallible’, even when it refers to knowledge in the objective sense, is but an abbreviation for: since our methods for ascertaining the truth-value of a particular statement about empirical reality are fallible in principle, there cannot be any certain knowledge about reality. In everyday life and in politics tolerance will be possible to the extent to which the recognition of this fallibility is more than a declaration. (shrink)

O. The idea of scientific progress in contemporary philosophy of science. Explicating the concept of cognitive progress means at the same time articulating an ideal of science. A desirable ideal: explain a lot and offer certainty. 1. Working out the ideal with the "foundationalist-positivist" approach. If the question, "When is it rational to accept a theory?" is answered, "When it has sufficient inductive support," this leads to insoluble problems. Reactions to the collapse of this approach - especially relativism and theory (...) instrumentalism. 2. The Popperian alternative: rational theory preference despite fallibility of methods for determining truth or greater accuracy of representations. What good reasons can there be for the conjecture that one theory is superior to a competing theory in its achievement as a description? Achievements to date as fallible but objective indicators of strength in describing. The sorts of risks for a theory differ in explanation and in prediction. Corresponding to the risks are the chances for cognitive progress. Instead of a cumulative index, itemized indication of success and failure in explanation and prediction with regard for importance of the questions at issue. On the concept of the "scientific importance" of questions. Postscript: On the political consequences of the sceptical position in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Popper's methodology does not entail any playing down of the various indispensible distinctions such as the distinction between knowing and guessing, the distinction between myth and science, the distinction between the observational and the theoretical, and between the vernacular and technical sublanguages or technical vocabulary. By avoiding both the totalization that led to the foundationalist position and the scepticist reactions to these frustrated foundationalist hopes, Popper's methodology makes it possible to combine fallibilism with a realist view of theories. It combines (...) the perennial willingness to re-examine positions, statements, etc. with the claim that a particular theory (as an item of knowledge in the objective sense) constitutes cognitive progress over its rivals. However, some of his formulations have been deliberately provocative and in this way have given rise to certain misgivings about possible paradoxical implications, even in philosophers congenial with Popper's approach. The concept of knowledge in the objective sense is, of course, an explicatum which Popper proposes primarily for use in methodology and epistemology. The concept is an expression of the acknowledgment of fallibility in principle. The phrasing that ‘knowledge is conjectural’ or ‘knowledge is fallible’, even when it refers to knowledge in the objective sense, is but an abbreviation for: since our methods for ascertaining the truth-value of a particular statement about empirical reality are fallible in principle, there cannot be any certain knowledge about reality. In everyday life and in politics tolerance will be possible to the extent to which the recognition of this fallibility is more than a declaration. (shrink)

Can research be studied in a way that is neither logical reconstruction nor empirical psychology or sociology of science? In contemporary philosophy of science this is usually denied—in spite of the recent 'paradigm shift' there. A system-philosophy approach in theory of research is outlined by means of some models: a research enterprise is viewed as a productive, innovative system, the research process as a transformation of complexes of knowledge-problems-instruments (software and hard ware). The direction this development takes is guided by (...) preconceptions about the subject matter and a programmatic conception of the discipline based on them ('internal steering factors'). The dynamics of the research process are schematized as a co-agency of 'theoretical and 'empirical' moments, which is viewed as a flow of problems, information, and conceptual frameworks. Empirically discovered pieces of knowledge may resist all attempts to explain them: the flow is disturbed, and only an extraordinary innovation on the 'theoretical' level can restore the balance. This involves a shift in perspective: a shift in the 'internal steering factors'. (In this way one type of 'scientific revolution' (Kuhn's type) is conceptualized). After a perspectival shift one will ask 'Does it constitute progress?' Types of criteria are suggested. Although they do not apply to all research situations, they over-arch research-traditions. Eventually the above models are applied in the reflection of Research Theory on itself. Research Theory should improve our knowledge about knowledge-production. This knowledge should contribute to improving our image of science and the researcher's sensitivity—by providing better tools for concept ualizing research situations and for imagining possible alternatives. (shrink)

Can research be studied in a way that is neither logical reconstruction nor empirical psychology or sociology of science? In contemporary philosophy of science this is usually denied—in spite of the recent 'paradigm shift' there. A system-philosophy approach in theory of research is outlined by means of some models : a research enterprise is viewed as a productive, innovative system, the research process as a transformation of complexes of knowledge-problems-instruments (software and hard ware). The direction this development takes is guided (...) by preconceptions about the subject matter and a programmatic conception of the discipline based on them ('internal steering factors'). The dynamics of the research process are schematized as a co-agency of 'theoretical and 'empirical' moments, which is viewed as a flow of problems, information, and conceptual frameworks. Empirically discovered pieces of knowledge may resist all attempts to explain them: the flow is disturbed, and only an extraordinary innovation on the 'theoretical' level can restore the balance. This involves a shift in perspective: a shift in the 'internal steering factors'. (In this way one type of 'scientific revolution' (Kuhn's type) is conceptualized). After a perspectival shift one will ask 'Does it constitute progress ?' Types of criteria are suggested. Although they do not apply to all research situations, they over-arch research-traditions. Eventually the above models are applied in the reflection of Research Theory on itself. Research Theory should improve our knowledge about knowledge-production. This knowledge should contribute to improving our image of science and the researcher's sensitivity—by providing better tools for concept ualizing research situations and for imagining possible alternatives. (shrink)

In his latest book Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Criticism and the History of Science, 1988), Gunnar Andersson clarifies the logical aspects of falsification and metalogical relationships between falsification, prediction and explanation. By analyzing the case studies on which Kuhn and Feyerabend have based their arguments for the incommensurability thesis, he shows that thesis to be untenable. A decisive criticism of the "new philosophy of science" is given. In the process Popper's methodology is developed further. It is shown that the "Kuhn Revolution" (...) is indeed a pseudo-revolution. (shrink)

Summary Research consists of choosing a problem, proposing and testing problem solutions, and presenting the results. In its central moment — conjectures and testing — science must be autonomous in order to be successful. Securing this autonomy by organizational means is one of the tasks of research policy. Research needs to justify itself only when the researcher makes a claim to the resources of others. To discuss problems of justification of governmental support, it is imperative to distinguish between basic and (...) applied research. In basic research the problem choice is guided only by considerations of scientific interest , while in applied research the problems emanate from extra-scientific concerns since applied research is by definition a means for tackling concrete practical problems. Deciding on external criteria (e.g. deciding whether to support more energy research or more cancer research) is a genuine political problem rather than a problem of research policy. Thus applied research can be justified by referring to the benefit the expected results will yield, but basic research requires a completely different justification. One such justification is the argument that applied research requires a certain overhead in basic research. Securing an adequate balance between funding basic and applied research within the problem area concerned is another task of research policy. (E.g. in the area of cancer whether to support more molecular biology research or more clinical research.) When the overhead argument is not applicable, there still remain several possible justifications for basic research. These are examined in the paper. When setting priorities for basic research within a certain discipline, one apparently must turn to the scientific community itself. It may well be that the researches, who constitute the only expertise available for this task, have to rely on tacit knowledge . If so, this remains afaute de mieux procedure since articulated criteria would be preferable to intuitive procedures. The purpose of methodological reflection on research policy making is to supply intellectual instruments for making the discussion about substantive problems more rational. The substantive problems can be tackled only through the close cooperation of research policy makers and researchers. Thus methodology should not limit the degrees of freedom of either but increase them. (shrink)

Summary The theory of research under development at this Institute aims at systematically describing and evaluating research and its products. It conceives research as an innovative sytem in which knowledge, problems and instruments are produced and processed. It proceeds by tacking between case studies of research enterprises (past or on-going) and constructing models over such features as data generation, hypothesis checking, systematization of pieces of knowledge, etc. Its auxiliaries are systems-theory, information theory, etc. It results should make possible a critical (...) examination of the factors that steer research processes — such as the perspective, criteria, ideals of science. A criticism informed by the results of this type of theory of research ought to be of value both for active researchers and for others concerned with research. (shrink)

Relativism in its various forms has become the mainstream tendency in philosophy, from epistemology to the philosophy of science, and its influence on ethics and political philosophy has been considerable. What are its main tenets? How can its popularity be explained, and, most importantly, how do the key contentions of relativism withstand a critical examination? (1) Criticism of the Criticism of Tradition often Leads to Relativism. (2) The Objectivist and the Relativist Approach Lead to Different Positions with Respect to Explanation, (...) Probability, the Role of Logic, and Rational Theory Preference. (3) The Relevance of the Objectivism-Relativism Debate for Political Philosophy and for Politics. (shrink)

Summary To understand the present situation we must know something about its history. The ‘Rise of the West’, which grew out of the ‘European Miracle’, is a special case of cultural evolution. The development of science is an important element in this process. Cultural evolution went hand in hand with biological evolution. Evolutionary epistemology illuminates the achievements and the evolution of cognitive sensory apparatus of various species. Man's cognitive sensory apparatus is adapted to the ‘mesocosmos’, the world of medium-sized dimensions. (...) The biological structures constitute the hardware of the cognitive sensory apparatus, while certain expectations and theories, which are ontogenetically apriori, constitute the corresponding system software. A distinction is introduced between ‘primary theories’ (linked to the sensory apparatus) and ‘secondary theories’. The latter are the result of attempts to meet the demand for an explanation of phenomena that cannot be explained in terms of ‘primary theories’. Two subsets of ‘secondary theories’ are compared: spiritualistic-personalized theories and scientific theories. From the historical point of view the scientific secondary theories are but a special subset of the class of secondary theories. From the systematic point of view it is instructive to focus on a comparison of the two subsets: what do they have in common? in what respects do they differ? The rise of scientific thinking is closely linked to the ‘European Miracle’. How (and when and why) did the West grow rich? To answer this question we must first produce an explanation of the principle: theories about the consequences of institutional arrangements. Then we can give a historical explanation of why this development took place in Europe and only there. It is claimed that the secret of success, economic wealth and the first approximations to relatively free societies, was the taming of the state, the taming of cleptocracy (independent of the nature of the agency having cleptocratic appetites, be it princes or parliaments). The taming of the state is a pre-democratic achievement. Finally, the consequences of institutional arrangements for scientific progress and innovation are examined. Only if the system is market-like, will it link individual effort with reward and, through the competitive process, encourage the wide dissemination and use of new ideas. There is no tradeoff between freedom on the one hand and economic success and the growth of scientific knowledge on the other. Freedom and the ensuing flexibility is the key to the past and to the future. (shrink)

Les principaux aspects de l’Etat Providence sont identifiés. Parce que les mêmes individus et les mêmes couches de la population bénéficient de la redistribution en même temps qu’ils sont frappés d’impôts, la “société malaxée” est une expression qui convient mieux aux démocraties modernes que ne l’est “l’Etat Providence”. Le développement historique du phénomène est retracé.. Le bismarckisme marque le tournant de l’idée originelle avec son image optimiste de l’homme sous sa forme moderne de la “société malaxée”. L’assistance sociale est un (...) phénomène induit par la démocratie. Le Léviathan se révèle être une vache à lait ; il s’étend de plus en plus et devient incroyablement gourmand. L’explication de l’émergence de la “société malaxée” met l’accent sur des facteurs intellectuels, en particulier sur la théorie politique du libéralisme. Le déclin du libéralisme peut être en partie expliqué par le caractère “dissolu” du libéralisme classique et de ses successeurs. L’article recherche la manière de renforcer le libéralisme. L’ébauche du libéralisme “strict” par Jasay est esquissée et analysée. Elle fournit le fondement d’un système de règles morales déontologiques. Un tel système est-il indispensable pour un ordre social compatible avec l’idée d’une société libre? Ou est-ce que la démocratie peut résoudre le problème? Cette question mène à une analyse de la dynamique de la méthode démocratique du choix collectif. Les remèdes susceptibles de favoriser l’émergence d’une société moins coercitive sont examinés.Central features of the welfare state are described. Since most redistribution now benefits the same persons and strata as it taxes, “Churning Society” is a more telling label for modern democracies than is the “welfare state”. The historical development of the phenomenon is sketched. Churning society is a democracy-induced phenomenon. Leviathan turns into a Milch Cow; it grows and grows and becomes incredibly voracious. The explanation of the rise of the churning society focuses on the intellectual factors, in particular on the political theory of liberalism. The decline of liberalism can be in part explained by the “looseness” of classical liberalism and its successors. The article inquires: how can liberalism be strengthened? Jasay’s design of “strict” liberalism is outlined and analyzed. It provides the basis of a system of deontological moral rules. Is such a system indispensable for a social order that is compatible with the idea of a free society? Or can democracy solve the problem? This question leads to an analysis of the dynamics of the democratic method of collective choice. Remedies are discussed that might help the emergence of a less unfree society. (shrink)

In our century, the philosophy of science has been overshadowed by two towering figures: Popper and Wittgenstein, both Viennese emigrants, who have become subjects to the Queen (cf., e.g., Radnitzky [1987a] Entre Wittgenstein et Popper ... ). The discussion has been structured by two great controversies: from the 30s Popper versus logical positivism (or falsificationism versus verificationism/probabilism), and from the 60s 'the new philosophy of science' versus Critical Rationalism. (Exemplary contributions to thes two controversies can be found, e.g., in (...) the two collections Radnitzky and Andersson (eds.) [1978], Progress... Science, and [1979], Structure...Science.) Wittgenstein's Tractatus has been the idee directrice of the Vienna Circle and its successor, Logical Empiricism. The cynosure of 'the new philosophy of science' is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as presented, in particular, in his Philosophical Investigations. If you apply it to the philosophy of science, you will view 'normative' methodology as a counterpart of ideal language philosophy, and hence regard any methodological prescriptions as unrealistic and claim that philosophy of science cannot do more than describe the practice of science, preferably in terms of case studies culled from the history of science. You will be placed on the road to relativism (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hiibner, and others). An interesting variant of relativism is Stegmiiller's attempt, with the help of the formal methods developed by Sneed, to give Kuhn's results a more exact form (Sneed, Stegmiiller, Moulines, Mostarin)-what Feyerabend has called 'the Sneedification of science'. Today, departments of philosophy of science are dominated by philosophers who either sympathize with logical empiricism or with 'the new philosophy of science'. Critical Rationalism has an outsider position, but enjoys the sympathy of many scientists (Bartley [1989], Unfathomed Knowledge .. .; see also Bartley [198 7b], 'Philosophy of biology ... ', and Munz [1987], ' ... the mirror of Rorty'). (shrink)

Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals (...) with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called “the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization. The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss “life as we do not know it”. The paper ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples. (shrink)

The actions of “world‐based” multinational corporations (MNCs) have effectively decoupled the revenue generation and the production sides of the business equation. This decoupling has led to an end of “virtuous capitalism,” which has widespread ramifications for the societies within highly developed countries as well as those in developing and underdeveloped nations. This article presents an overview of the defining aspects of virtuous corporations and the linkages to virtuous capitalism. It then describes the actions of Apple Computer as emblematic of an (...) MNC that is nonvirtuous in its practices. The article then discusses how the encouragement of globalized trade has prompted the shift away from virtuous capitalism and closes with a summary of possible actions that could reverse the decline in corporate virtue. (shrink)

El trabajo expone, analiza, y evalúa los datos de una nueva fuente sobre las visiones jurídicas de los ‛ulamā’ con respecto al estatuto islámico de las comunidades islámicas bajo dominio cristiano en la Península Ibérica desde el siglo XII hasta el siglo XVI. Se trata de una fetua desconocida e inédita del sabio andalusí Ibn Rabī‛ y fetuas desconocidas de los principales cadíes de los cuatro madhabs sunníes en El Cairo hacia 1510 A.D. Muy probablemente, hay que relacionar la primera (...) fetua con los acontecimientos en Murcia tras la sublevación mudejar de 1265 y la reconquista cristiana de la ciudad en 1266. El muftí subraya que los musulmanes que viven bajo dominio cristiano están imperativamente obligados a emigrar a territorio islámico. Los principales cadíes de los cuatro madhabs sunníes en El Cairo al principio del siglo XVI, sin embargo, defienden un modo de ver mucho más pragmático. Probablemente, las preguntas fueron planteadas por mudejares de Valencia, que estaban en El Cairo camino de la peregrinación. Finalmente, los autores plantean que hay que distinguir dos tipos coexistentes de visiones con respecto al estatuto del Islam bajo dominio cristiano en la Península Ibérica desde principios del siglo xii; una visión pragmática, equivalente a un reconocimiento de facto del Islam bajo dominio cristiano, y una visión «de rechazo», que asume la obligación de emigrar de la España cristiana a Dār al-Islām. El impacto variable de estas visiones jurídicas merece un estudio más profundo dentro del ambiente histórico de las complejas y cambiantes relaciones políticas entre Islam y Cristiandad en esa época. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objeto dar una versión diferente y más breve del poema que contiene una demanda morisca de ayuda al Imperio Otomano, poema estudiado por James Monroe en Al-Andalus XXXI, 281-303. Esta versión indica que había habido otra demanda similar por parte de los moriscos al sultán mameluco de El Cairo, y que ésta era la original. El artículo contiene: 1) un análisis comparativo de las versiones de la casida dirigidas a los mamelucos y a los otomanos, 2) (...) el marco histórico de las relaciones entre los reinos cristianos y musulmanes de la Península Ibérica por un lado y los territorios mameluco y otomano por otro, y 3) una discusión de la fecha de las dos versiones de la casida, así como su autoría. Parece probable que el autor de la casida perteneciera a círculos de musulmanes granadinos que habían formado parte de las clases dirigentes de Granada y que luego habían aceptado puestos en la administración cristiana de la ciudad, como son, por ejemplo, varios miembros de la familia al-Baqannī, algunos de los cuales habían emigrado con Ibn al-Azraq al Norte de África, pero regresaron para integrarse en los grupos dirigentes mudéjares. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la aportación de los moriscos a los estudios árabes, concluyendo que ésta fue modesta en la Península Ibérica. Algunos moriscos contribuyeron de forma activa al conocimiento del árabe a través de sus estudios sobre temas árabo-islámicos. Se demuesttra que el converso mudéjar conocido como Juan Andrés, autor de uno de los más influyentes tratados contra el Islam, fue un canónigo de la Catedral de Granada. Se aborda brevemente la cuestión de la contribución de los moriscos a la (...) traducción e interpretación de los Libros Plúmbeos y se estudia su contribucción, con posterioridad a la expulsión, a los estudios árabes e islámicos. La última parte del trabajo se centra en Holanda (República de los Siete Países Bajos Unidos) donde, como resultado de circunstancias históricas y ciertas contingencias como las relaciones personales, los moriscos desarrollaron un importante papel. En este caso, además del estudio de la lengua árabe en sí mismo, las ciencias físicas cobraron una notable importancia, circunstancia relacionada, en un marco más amplio, con la emergencia de los estudios árabes en Europa, que incorporan tanto las ciencias físicas como la religión y la filosofía, además del interés por el Norte de África, incluidas sus aplicaciones en la vida diaria. (shrink)

Este artículo está dedicado al famoso pergamino encontrado en 1588 en el antiguo minarete de la que había sido mezquita aljama de Granada, con textos en árabe, latín y castellano. Junto con los libros plúmbeos descubiertos en diversas cuevas a las afueras de la ciudad entre 1595 y 1600, el pergamino está en los orígenes de un importante culto nacional. El artículo presenta un análisis de la composición y escritura del pergamino y pasa revista a las trascripciones y traducciones que (...) se hicieron por testigos cristianos y musulmanes . Éstas se comparan críticamente con los principales elementos del pergamino y se discuten los comentarios paleográfícos hechos por estos testigos contemporáneos . Como conclusión, los autores mantienen que el documento transferido desde el Vaticano en el año 2000, es el original encontrado en 1588 a pesar de lo incomprensible de los textos árabes y de la corrupción de los textos castellano y latino Según los autores, no hay base para considerar al pergamino como documento proto-islámico, puesto que se trata de un mensaje católico romano anunciando la destrucción del islam. Al mismo tiempo, el documento incluye un mensaje simbólico al mostrar que los cristianos granadinos del siglo I, incluyendo a Cecilius, escribían árabe y castellano, lo mismo que hacían los moriscos. Así, aunque el Islam había de ser extirpado, la lengua árabe se podía armonizar con una vida genuinamente cristiana. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Editor’s IntroductionGerard A. HauserThe call for papers for this special issue of Philosophy and Rhetoric1 acknowledged the continuous centrality of human agency across the history of Western thought on rhetoric. At its ancient Greek origins, the Sophists and philosophers were at swords points over the question of what constituted responsible speech and who had responsibility for the consequences of moving the demos to public actions that bore on the (...) city-state and the lives of its citizens. On the one hand, sophistic understood the human world as indeterminate, progressing or regressing through appeals that would establish social and political reality for the community through the power of language and argument to move the minds and hearts of citizens. Protagoras expressed this vision with his aphorism, "Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not." Central to their understanding of the human world was a recognition and exploration of language's psychogogic powers. For the philosophers, on the other hand, sophistic's position represented a problematic abandonment of the quest for Eternal Truth.The tension between the quest for contingent truth and Eternal Truth is illustrated by Xenophon's rendition of the aftermath of the Athenian naval victory at Arginoussai, in 406 BCE. In his Hellenika,2 he recounts how some of the victorious fleet's sailors became separated from it during the confusion of battle and were left behind. Although the commanders sent a group to rescue them, violent seas thwarted their efforts and the men drowned. Upon returning to Athens as victors, the commanders were arrested and charged with cowardice. The Ecclesia met to decide whether to bind them over for trial. The commanders seemed to have persuaded most of their innocence, but time ran out for that day's proceedings before a vote on whether to bind them over for a trial could be taken. That evening, at a festival in the city, opponents of the commanders attended dressed in [End Page 181] black mourning clothes and pretended to be grieving relatives of the lost sailors. Their displays of sorrow over the sailors' deaths were so convincing that they swung the emotions of many in the opposite direction.The next day, opponents of the commanders played upon the events of the night before and the citizens, remembering the displays of grief they had witnessed, were persuaded to try the commanders themselves, rather than deciding whether to bind them over to the courts for trial. Arguments went back and forth on how to interpret the tragic event—were the commanders brave but foiled by nature, or was their conduct spineless? Did they deserve a laurel wreath for their victory in battle, or to be executed for cowardice in allowing the stranded sailors to drown? Finally a vote was taken and, reversing their sentiment from the day before, the citizens voted to condemn the commanders. The military leaders were taken away to be executed. Soon thereafter, Xenophon tells us, the citizens had a change of heart and wished to reverse their verdict. However, since it was too late—the generals having already been put to death!—they lodged a complaint against those who had persuaded them to convict for "deceiving the People."The story may be read as a representative anecdote of rhetoric's fatal flaw or of rhetoric's constitutive powers of agency. On one reading, Athenian Ecclesiasts, convulsed with emotion, were stripped of their agency by arguments seeking the probable through sensory engagement structured by phantasia and mimesis3 while lacking a foundation in the Eternally True. However, it also may be read as disclosing the absence of Eternal Truth on which to ground a human world, and the agential power of language—of rhetoric—to constitute understanding and action.4 On one side, agency resided in the self-aware person who made responsible arguments with reference to pure reason and ideal justice. On the other, agency resided in the powers of language to engage thoughts and emotions, of discourse to circulate, and of representative thinking5 for discovering human reality. These latter were products of human... (shrink)

_Philosophy and Rhetoric, _one of Penn State Press’s longest-running journals, was conceived at a time of immense philosophical upheaval: rhetoric as a field of study—first dismissed by Descartes—was being reexamined after decades of neglect. Now, nearly forty years later, _Philosophy and Rhetoric _continues to hold pride of place in this reinvigorated discipline. The brainchild of Penn State professors Carroll Arnold and Henry Johnstone, _Philosophy and Rhetoric_ boasts work from dozens of international luminaries from a broad spectrum of specializations. To commemorate (...) the fortieth year of publication, current series editor Gerard Hauser assembled a volume of the journal’s most noteworthy articles, beginning with Henry Johnstone’s gem of an essay underscoring the essential relationship between the art of rhetoric and philosophy. Donald Verene elaborates that initial thesis and suggests that rhetoric and philosophy are not distinct entities in conversation, but instead that rhetoric provides a forum in which philosophy can exist. Jean Goodwin looks at the theory in terms of a teacher/student relationship, and Barbara Biesecker looks at how governments in the war on terror employ rhetoric to manipulate the social consciousness. A concluding article by Carroll Arnold casts rhetoric as a dramatic device essential to establishing personal sovereignty. During its forty years, Hauser writes, the journal “radically altered the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric from irreconcilable antagonists to interlocutors in a shared inquiry into the constitutive powers of discourse.” This series of essays brilliantly traces the arc of that accomplishment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Memory:James Patrick McDanielGAHJames Patrick McDaniel, who served as Book Review Editor of Philosophy and Rhetoric, died November 10, 2004, at age 38. He was at the beginning of a career with exceptional promise and whose accomplishments had earned him the National Communication Association's Karl Wallace Award, given to support the research of a scholar within ten years of earning the doctorate. James was just beginning to place his (...) stamp on our book review section. His selection of books reflected his broad command of diverse literatures; his selection of reviewers showed a commitment to bringing fresh and welcome voices into our conversation. James touched the journal in other ways. His essay "Liberal Irony: A Program for Rhetoric" (35:4) was part of an important and ongoing intellectual exchange in P&R. I called on him frequently to review submissions, especially ones that needed a reader with an eye for making a manuscript better. His critiques were models of generosity, even when he disagreed with the author, and his comments, singularly insightful and intelligent, reflected judgment I came to trust. He was invaluable to me as journal editor and as a student of rhetoric.In addition to his work with the journal, I had come to know him as a valued colleague in Colorado's Communication department, a sublimely gifted teacher, an astute mentor of graduate students, a remarkable father, and a loyal and loving friend. In more ways than I dare mention, Jim made the journal better from his association with it and my life happy from the pleasure of his company. I shall miss him dearly.Copyright © 2005 The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Memory Thomas FarrellOn June 12, 2006, Thomas Farrell died after a long illness. Tom was Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University and a long-standing member of the journal's editorial board. He was appointed by the journal's founding editor, Henry Johnstone, and Henry regarded him as among the most talented minds writing about our common subject. Tom also was a publishing author in Philosophy and Rhetoric. His research (...) refl ected a deep understanding of the intersections of philosophical thought and rhetoric with respect to argumentation, language, speech acts, and political theory. His award-winning book, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (Yale, 1993), is a testament to the insights afforded by the rapprochement between philosophy and rhetoric that has been the journal's defi ning character. With his passing, the inter-discipline has lost one of its most eloquent and accomplished voices, the journal has lost a contributor and editorial advisor of the first rank, and those of us who knew Tom have lost a dear friend, whose intellect and wit always brightened our moments together.Copyright © 2006 The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

I begin with an anecdote. While a senior at a small liberal arts college, I participated in a year-long senior seminar on evolution. The central questions were how we come to be human and, more basically, what it means to be human. Units were taught from the perspectives of biology, various traditions of philosophy, theology, education, history, and world literature. Faculty were drawn from across the curriculum, each taking units and assigning readings from their discipline that addressed our central questions (...) from an evolutionary perspective. Importantly, the faculty leading seminar discussions also attended each session, so that every meeting possessed the possibility of full-scale intellectual battle not only... (shrink)

James Arnt Aune, who served on the editorial board of Philosophy and Rhetoric, died on 8 January 2013. Jim was an accomplished scholar of the first rank, whose articles, books, and papers reflected broad knowledge and deep insight. He left his mark on the journal through frequent and reliably rigorous reviews that were distinctive for their careful attention to arguments and extensive historical and bibliographic references aimed at improving work, even when he had profound intellectual differences with the author. His (...) comments to the editor often included his own concerns that he may have been too harsh or that his criticisms might be defeating to the author. I seldom felt the need to edit them, however, because .. (shrink)